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Abstract
Baghdad, Christchurch or Paris: Over the last years, many cities were the location of 
extremist attacks – but only some incidents were covered as “terrorism”. Journalists 
selectively attach the label to particular acts of political violence. This study analyses 
how characteristics of attacks and their perpetrators influence whether news media 
portray incidents as terrorism. Based on attacks between 2012 and 2018 (N = 86,668) 
and their coverage in the German press (N = 5411), the study finds that highly lethal 
incidents in Western countries are more likely to be called terrorism. Moreover, news 
more often portrays violence by Islamist extremists as terrorism than attacks by right- 
or left-wing extremists. Small or inconsistent effects emerge when comparing violence 
by lone actors to those by groups and domestic to international terrorism. The study 
illustrates that news is highly selective in which acts of political violence are presented 
as terrorism, which may foster stereotypes and prevent policy responses towards 
different forms of extremism.
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When Islamist extremists1 attacked citizens in Paris in 2015, media outlets were quick to 
condemn these acts as terrorism. When a white supremacist targeted a church in 
Charleston, however, news was more hesitant to use the term (de Veen and Thomas, 
2020). Consequently, journalists (Fisher, 2017) and researchers (Betus et al., 2020; 
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Ghazi-Tehrani and Kearns, 2020) have started to question whether news is too selective, 
even biased in which attacks are called terrorism – and which are not.
How news media portray political violence has consequences. Journalists often asso-
ciate Islam with terrorism (Dixon and Williams, 2015; Matthes et al., 2020), which may 
foster Islamophobia (Von Sikorski et al., 2021). Violence by left- or right-wing extrem-
ists, however, is largely ignored (Mitnik et al., 2020). What news presents as terrorism 
reflects ‘which groups society is willing to protect, and what kind of violence it is willing 
to tolerate’ (Fisher, 2017: no page) – or counteract. Given that terrorism is a highly politi-
cized term (Schmid, 2011), its use has policy implications. In crises, journalists rely on 
governmental sources. Politicians can capitalize on this and convey their interpretation 
of violence through the news, for example to legitimize war against actors they call ter-
rorists (Ahmad, 2020).
This study analyses how incident and perpetrator characteristics influence whether 
news portrays political violence as terrorism. It combines a manual content analysis of 
N = 5411 articles in five German newspapers and magazines with data from terrorism 
studies. The study illustrates systematic differences in how political violence is covered: 
News predominantly presents lethal attacks in Western countries by Islamist extremists 
as terrorism.
This study advances research in three ways: From a theoretical perspective, it illus-
trates how Social Identity Theory may not only serve to understand stereotypic coverage 
of Islam (Matthes et al., 2020) and related media effects (Schmuck et al., 2021; Von 
Sikorski et al., 2017, 2021) but also journalistic use of the pejorative label ‘terrorism’. 
The paper also addresses two empirical gaps: Research on journalistic labelling of differ-
ent attacks is largely absent, at least apart from case studies including few incidents (de 
Veen and Thomas, 2020; Elmasry and el-Nawawy, 2020).2 By comparing N = 86,668 
attacks and their coverage, this study delivers a more comprehensive picture of why 
journalists may decide to portray political violence as terrorism. Furthermore, it extends 
scholarly knowledge on the influence of perpetrator characteristics. Despite an uptick in 
white supremacist violence (Cai and Landon, 2019) and journalists being criticized for 
their hesitance to call related incidents terrorism (de Veen and Thomas, 2020), most stud-
ies either ignore the role of perpetrator characteristics or only focus on how violence by 
Islamist extremists is covered (Sui et al., 2017). To better understand whether journalists 
emphasize the threat posed by some types of perpetrators while ignoring others, this 
study analyses a broader range of perpetrator characteristics than has been done in previ-
ous studies.
Defining political violence and terrorism
Political violence, that is, violence by state and non-state actors to influence governance, 
includes war, military coups – and terrorism (Kalyvas, 2019). The Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD), one of the most extensive databases on terrorist attacks, defines terror-
ism as ‘the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to 
attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimida-
tion.’ (Start, 2019: 10) Similar to most definitions, the GTD understands terrorism as the 
(threatened) use of violence for political ends (Weinberg et al., 2004). However, scholars 
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disagree about a variety of other aspects when conceptualizing terrorism (Nacos, 2016; 
Schmid, 2011), some of which also pertain to the GTD’s definition. For instance, there is 
an ongoing debate about whether states can perpetrate terrorism, with the GTD exclud-
ing state terrorism. Additionally, scholars emphasize that terrorism targets civilians or 
non-combatants (Weinberg et al., 2004), while the GTD also includes violence against 
other targets.
Overall, more than hundred definitions of terrorism exist, often in addition to govern-
mental conceptualizations (Beck and Miner, 2013; Schmid, 2011). While the GTD’s con-
ceptualization therefore serves as one example for how terrorism can be defined, a 
consensus definition has yet to be agreed upon.
A critical perspective on defining terrorism
Importantly, critical terrorism studies has challenged the assumption that a consensus 
definition is possible as definitions of terrorism are ‘influenced by cultural, social, and 
political factors’ (McCann and Pimley, 2020: 807).3 In particular, national contexts influ-
ence how institutions conceptualize terrorism. For example, Western governments do not 
necessarily designate those actors as terrorists that have the highest track record of vio-
lence against their citizens. Rather, geopolitical interests and contexts, for example Islam 
and Islamist extremism being perceived as particularly incompatible with Western socie-
ties, influence national perceptions of and responses to terrorism (Beck and Miner, 2013; 
Meier, 2020). Consequently, scholars stress that we should question whether terrorism 
can be defined objectively at all. Jackson (2007: 247) argues that terrorism is not some-
thing we can measure, but a pejorative label used to convey ‘political judgement about 
the legitimacy of actors and their actions.’ If acts are called terrorism, this carries an 
implicit evaluation concerning their presumed illegitimacy which allows for law enforce-
ment to justify countermeasures. Thus, governments may not only define terrorism in 
line with prevailing cultural, social and political sentiments, for example by more often 
designating Islamist extremists as terrorists. They also strategically use the term to con-
demn specific forms of political violence and advance political agendas. However, poli-
ticians are not the only ones contributing to the construction of the terrorist threat – so do 
news media (Nacos, 2016; Rothenberger, 2021). 
How news media define terrorism
Before summarizing important patterns in coverage of political violence, the paper 
underlines how national identities, including those of journalists, influence perceptions 
of violence and, thus, coverage.
National identities and coverage of political violence
The concept of national identities describes ‘a subjective or internalized sense of belong-
ing to the nation’ (Huddy and Khatib, 2007: 65), that is, the belief in shared values in a 
country in difference to those not part of it. According to Huddy and Khatib (2007), the 
concept is understood best through the lenses of Social Identity Theory (SIT). According 
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to SIT, ‘part of an individual’s self-concept [. . .] derives from his knowledge of his 
membership of a social group (or groups) together with the emotional significance 
attached to that membership.’ (Tajfel, 1974: 69) Following Tajfel and Turner (2004), 
individuals consider themselves as being part of in-groups (‘us’) in difference to out-
groups (‘them’) which leads to in- and out-group bias. In-group members are perceived 
more positively and individuals act in line with their interests while out-group members 
are perceived negatively. 
Importantly, in- and out-group bias is partly activated under threat, including terrorist 
attacks (Van Hauwaert and Huber, 2020). Threats make perceived belonging to an in-
group, for example one’s nation, and differences to out-groups, for example perpetrators 
of violence or those assumed to agree with them, more salient. Thus, SIT plays an impor-
tant role in understanding coverage of political violence and its effects (Matthes et al., 
2020; Schmuck et al., 2021; Von Sikorski et al., 2017, 2021). Nossek (2004: 344) argues 
that in- and out-group thinking is decisive for how journalists cover political violence as 
‘professional norms become subordinate to the national identity of the reporting corre-
spondent.’ National identities influence coverage as journalists feel compelled to take a 
clear stance on the illegitimacy of violence by condemning acts as terrorism, especially 
if in-group members, for example domestic audiences, are targeted. Oftentimes, journal-
ists are part of the in-group and may feel threatened themselves, which affects reporting 
(Abubakar, 2020). Journalists also interpret violence in line with prevailing sentiments 
(Nossek, 2004). For instance, journalists downplay violence by the in-group, for exam-
ple, domestic citizens, and exaggerate threats by the out-group, for example, foreigners 
(Fishman and Marvin, 2003). As journalists rely on governmental information during 
crises, politicians can more easily access the news flow and further reinforce in- and out-
group bias through calls for unification by the nation or condemnation of out-groups 
(Ahmad, 2020). In conclusion, journalistic use of the term terrorism may be an indicator 
of in- and out-group bias: Journalists suggest for acts of violence and their perpetrators 
to be illegitimate, often due to an increased salience of journalists’ national identities 
during attacks.
The influence of incident and perpetrator characteristics
Coverage of political violence, including terrorism, is highly selective: Most attacks are 
either never reported on or only mentioned briefly, while few incidents dominate the 
headlines (Chermak and Gruenewald, 2006). News is also selective in how political 
violence is described. Journalists can indicate the legitimacy of violence by using labels 
carrying negative (‘terrorists’) or positive (‘freedom fighters’) sentiments (Rothenberger 
and Hase, 2021). Editorial departments often recommend for journalists to avoid the 
term terrorism due to its pejorative meaning. However, journalists feel compelled to rely 
on it as recipients expects them to or governmental sources use the term (Abubakar, 
2020). Importantly, studies indicate systematic differences in which attacks are called 
terrorism (Betus et al., 2020; Ghazi-Tehrani and Kearns, 2020). Two aspects influence 
selective coverage, although their impact has mostly been analysed concerning the vol-
ume of coverage, not its content (Mitnik et al., 2020): incident and perpetrator 
characteristics.
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Incident characteristics describe event-related aspects, including the location, lethal-
ity or victims of violence. Attacks in proximate countries are covered more frequently, 
especially if they are lethal (Sui et al., 2017). Studies also indicate that the type of victim 
influences coverage (Chermak and Gruenewald, 2006; Mitnik et al., 2020). Most studies 
analysing the role of incident characteristics have relied on news values theory (Galtung 
and Ruge, 1965) to show that the proximity of incidents or negativity in the form of 
fatalities as important news values increase the newsworthiness of incidents and, thus, 
coverage. 
However, journalists also draw on perpetrator characteristics, that is, information on 
individuals or groups behind attacks, to understand whether violence is perpetrated by 
in- or out-group members and who is likely being targeted, often based on SIT. In par-
ticular, lone actor terrorism has received more attention recently (Cai and Landon, 2019; 
Fisher, 2017). While there is conceptual ambiguity about the term (Kenyon et al., 2021), 
lone actor terrorism is often defined as attacks by individual(s) instead of terrorist 
groups.4 Additionally, domestic terrorism as violence by domestic citizens on domestic 
soil (Berkebile, 2017)5 is covered differently than international terrorism. Studies indi-
cate that domestic terrorism is covered more frequently (Chermak and Gruenewald, 
2006; Mitnik et al., 2020), presumably because in-group members are involved as perpe-
trators, victims or both. Studies also indicate for perpetrators’ ideology to play a role. 
Attacks by self-identified Muslims (Kearns et al., 2019) and, partly, Islamist extremist 
groups (Sui et al., 2017) are covered more as Muslims are considered an out-group in 
many Western societies. While most studies analyse how incident and perpetrator char-
acteristics influence the volume of coverage, their impact on the labelling of political 
violence has largely been neglected. Thus, the paper now introduces the hypotheses and 
research questions of this study.
Location of attacks. Turning to incident characteristics, attacks in countries that are geo-
graphically or culturally close may be covered differently. Proximity is an important 
news value that influences how much attacks are covered (Sui et al., 2017). If political 
violence is ‘too far removed to be of concern to [. . .] news consumers’ (Chermak and 
Gruenewald, 2006: 439), it may be ignored. Proximity may also influence labelling. Fol-
lowing SIT, attacks on Western countries are considered a bigger threat for in-group 
members: If Western journalists and their audiences can identify with victims, for exam-
ple domestic citizens or citizens in other Western countries presumably sharing similar 
values, this may activate in- and out-group thinking (Schmuck et al., 2021). Attacks in 
Western countries may be perceived as an attack on ‘us’ and lead to condemnation of 
violence as being illegitimate, that is, terrorism. Journalists themselves report that (per-
sonal) affectedness motivates them to report on violence as terrorism (Abubakar, 2020). 
In line with this, Matthes et al. (2020) show that more proximate attacks lead to stronger 
in- and out-group bias in the news, specifically negative portrayals of out-groups. Simi-
larly, Ismail and Mishra (2019) illustrate that US coverage of two very similar attacks in 
Beirut and Paris was far more emotional when describing the latter, presumably because 
journalists perceived victims to be more similar. For the US, Elmasry and el-Nawawy 
(2020: 13) demonstrate that journalists more often portrayed attacks in Western countries 
as terrorism than similar incidents in Maiduguri and Ankara, ‘despite the fact that all 
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[. . .] easily meet textbook definitions of terrorism’. Thus, if journalists identify with 
victims, they may be more likely to condemn violence as terrorism.
H1: Attacks in Western Europe or North America are more likely to be portrayed as 
terrorism than attacks elsewhere.
Lethality of attacks. Lethal attacks are covered more frequently (Kearns et al., 2019; Sui 
et al., 2017) as lethality is an indicator of negativity which, as a news value, increases the 
newsworthiness of violence. Lethal attacks may not only be more newsworthy, but also 
activate in- and out-group bias. According to terror management theory, mortality sali-
ence as individual awareness about death fosters in- and out-group thinking (Burke et al., 
2010). As Cuillier (2012) shows, this effect also pertains to journalists as it leads to out-
group bias in their coverage. Mortality salience may be induced by deadly attacks across 
the globe, independent of who is affected: Matthes et al. (2020: 2418) demonstrate that 
out-group bias towards Muslims in the news increases with the lethality of attacks as 
‘deaths [. . .] lead to more mortality salience, which fosters intergroup bias.’ Similarly, 
Ghazi-Tehrani and Kearns (2020) illustrate that US news outlets are more likely to cover 
an incident as terrorism the more deaths it caused. Nagar (2010) shows that groups which 
perpetrate lethal attacks are more often portrayed as terrorists in the news, independent 
of where their attacks occurred. Thus, lethal attacks across the globe may increase in- 
and out-group bias through mortality salience and, correspondingly, influence how vio-
lence is portrayed.
H2: The higher the number of fatalities, the more likely an attack is to be portrayed as 
terrorism.
Victim of attacks. Some scholars stress that political violence should only be called ter-
rorism when targeting non-combatant targets (Weinberg et al., 2004). Attacks on civil-
ians or tourists may be perceived as more gruesome, thus more in line with the assumed 
illegitimacy of terrorism. As already mentioned, Schmuck et al. (2021) show that the 
more news audiences identify with the victims of attacks, the more emotional their reac-
tions to coverage and, thus, in- and out-group bias – an effect that may extend to journal-
ists. Studies analysing whether attacks on civilians receive more coverage do not find 
consistent associations (Chermak and Gruenewald, 2006; Mitnik et al., 2020); however, 
almost none have analysed how the type of victim influences labelling. Ghazi-Tehrani 
and Kearns (2020) illustrate that attacks on some targets, for example, law enforcement 
or the government, are less likely to be covered with references to terrorism than those 
on other targets – but their comparison category of ‘other targets’ is not limited to civil-
ians. Thus, it is unclear whether targeting civilians and tourists as victims audiences and 
journalists can more easily identify with influences labelling.
RQ1: Are attacks on citizens, public places or tourists more likely to be portrayed as 
terrorism than attacks on other targets?
Lone actors versus groups. Turning to perpetrator characteristics, the threat of lone actor 
terrorism has been a frequent object of discussions (Cai and Landon, 2019; Fisher, 2017). 
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Underlining the salience of the issue, Schmuck et al. (2018) finds that if German recipi-
ents are presented with news about attacks where the perpetrator has not been identified, 
around 40% assumed lone actors to be responsible (see similarly Schmuck et al., 2021). 
However, lone actor terrorism – here defined as violence by individuals instead of groups 
– may be considered less threatening: If attacks are perpetrated by formal organizations, 
recipients are more likely to perceive them as terrorism (Huff and Kertzer, 2018). 
D’Orazio and Salehyan (2018: 1022) underline that ‘a “lone wolf” attacker may be dis-
missed as a single, isolated threat, while ties to a larger organization imply that others 
hold similar, extreme beliefs’ which may be seen as a bigger threat for the in-group. 
Consequently, Betus et al. (2020) find that attacks by formal groups are more likely to be 
covered with references to terrorism. Otherwise, they are portrayed as acts by perpetra-
tors with mental illnesses (see similarly Ghazi-Tehrani and Kearns, 2020). 
H3: Attacks by groups are more likely to be portrayed as terrorism than attacks by 
individuals.
Domestic vs international terrorism. Domestic terrorism as violence by domestic citizens 
on domestic soil is covered more frequently (Chermak and Gruenewald, 2006; Mitnik 
et al., 2020). Still, citizens more strongly associate international perpetrators with terror-
ism (Huff and Kertzer, 2018), presumably because they have less difficulties imagining 
foreigners as terrorists than their fellow citizens. We also know that journalists downplay 
violence by domestic citizens (Fishman and Marvin, 2003). Overall, attacks by domestic 
citizens on domestic soil as acts of domestic terrorism are often depicted as isolated 
incidents caused by individuals with mental problems. In contrast, international perpe-
trators attacking one’s nation are portrayed as angry extremists who may attack again 
soon, thus posing a bigger threat (Crenshaw, 2014). These differences may be due to 
racial bias, for instance journalists being hesitant to connect white perpetrators assumed 
to be Western citizens to terrorism (Ghazi-Tehrani and Kearns, 2020).
H4: International terrorism is more likely to be portrayed as terrorism than domestic 
terrorism.
Ideology of perpetrators. Political violence can be motivated by an array of ideologies, 
including religious, nationalist/ethnic, left-wing and right-wing extremism. In recent 
years, news has largely focused on one ideology: Islamist extremism. Journalists are 
more likely to cover attacks by self-identified Muslims (Kearns et al., 2019) and, partly, 
Islamist extremist groups (Sui et al., 2017). Journalists often portray Muslims as an out-
group by associating Islam with terrorism (Dixon and Williams, 2015; Matthes et al., 
2020) and depicting violence by perpetrators who self-identify as Muslims as terrorism 
(Betus et al., 2020; de Veen and Thomas, 2020), as expected due to out-group bias. How-
ever, we know less about how other forms of extremism such as right-wing or left-wing 
extremism are covered, especially in comparison to Islamist extremism. Mitnik et al. 
(2020) find that US news reports more often on violence by Islamist extremists than on 
attacks by, for example, left-wing extremists. This indicates that journalists more often 
ignore violence by perpetrators motivated by other ideologies. Similarly, Nagar (2010) 
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finds that news more often associates Islamist groups with terrorism than ethnic/nation-
alist groups or left-wing extremists. 
H5: Attacks by Islamist extremists are more likely to be portrayed as terrorism than 
attacks by unknown perpetrators, perpetrators with unclear motives, or perpetrators 
following other ideologies.
However, news does not necessarily cover every attack by Islamist extremists. Instead, 
it focuses on incidents in Western countries. For example, the November 2015 attacks in 
Paris by the so-called Islamic State were covered extensively while lethal attacks in 
Beirut just a day prior received far less attention (Ismail and Mishra, 2019). Schmuck 
et al. (2018, 2021) demonstrate that if German recipients are presented with attacks 
where the perpetrator is unidentified, they more often assume the perpetrator to be an 
Islamist extremist if they can identify with victims. In conclusion, both journalists and 
recipients perceive Islamist extremism as a threat mainly directed towards Western 
citizens.6
H6: The effect of Islamist extremism on the portrayal of attacks as terrorism is stronger 
if attacks occur in Western Europe or North America.
Method
Setting the scene: Terrorism in Germany
Between 2012 and 2018, Germany suffered 177 terrorist attacks leading to a total of 29 
fatalities. Prominent incidents included Islamist extremists attacking a Christmas market 
in Berlin or the right-wing Freital Group targeting refugees. However, attacks and fatali-
ties were considerably higher in the United States, the United Kingdom or France (Start, 
2019). Previous studies on the labelling of violence focused almost exclusively on the 
US (Betus et al., 2020; Elmasry and el-Nawawy, 2020; Ghazi-Tehrani and Kearns, 2020). 
Given that the country was more affected, we might find stronger in- and out-group bias 
in US news, and thus, findings ‘may not translate cross-nationally’ (Betus et al., 2020: 
16). In addition, previous studies mostly considered attacks in the US (Betus et al., 2020; 
Ghazi-Tehrani and Kearns, 2020) – but recent years have been characterized by an uptick 
of violence across the globe (Start, 2019). By focusing on Germany, we can therefore 
learn how previous findings translate to countries less affected by terrorism and attacks 
outside the US.
Dependent variable: Media coverage
In this study, the unit of analysis is every attack in the GTD. The dependent variable 
indicates whether an attack was covered as terrorism (0 = No, 1 = Yes). All attacks listed 
by the GTD between 2012 and 2018 were retrieved (N = 86,668). The observation period 
is limited to these years as the GTD only included information until 2018 at the time of 
data collection and its methodology changed from 2012 on. The GTD employs an 
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inclusive definition of terrorism: It includes cases suspected to be crime or lacking a 
clear motive (Start, 2019). Thus, it is unlikely that news reports on attacks not listed 
here.7 However, readers should note that by relying on the GTD, the study cannot meas-
ure coverage of state terrorism.
Online and offline coverage from five German newspapers and magazines was sam-
pled, namely Der Spiegel, Focus, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Welt and Die Zeit and their 
online counterparts Spiegel.de, Focus.de, Sueddeutsche.de, Welt.de and Zeit.de. These 
outlets are highly popular. Moreover, they include left- and right-leaning views. However, 
please note that Die Welt represents the only conservative outlet in the sample.
Using the database Factiva and the search term ‘atleast2 terror*’, articles including 
the word ‘terrorism’ or related terms at least twice were retrieved as a first step. The term 
‘terror’ had to occur more than once to assure that articles primarily discussed terrorism. 
Articles describing terrorist attacks, its victims or its perpetrators were retrieved. 
According to this second step of the manual content analysis, N = 5411 articles were 
identified as relevant (α = .87). Conservative outlets, here Die Welt, more frequently 
wrote about terrorism: 32.9% of articles were published by the conservative outlet while 
67.1% were published by the four remaining central/liberal outlets (see Supplementary 
Material, Element A1).
Next, the study analysed which attacks in the GTD were mentioned in these articles. 
Importantly, an attack was only coded as mentioned if journalists called the incident a 
terrorist attack or described its perpetrators as terrorists, that is, clearly portrayed it as 
terrorism. According to this third step of the content analysis, N = 2028 attacks were 
mentioned by the German press (percent agreement = .84). For details on the coding 
process, please see the Supplementary Material (Element A1).
Independent variables: Incident and perpetrator characteristics
Incident characteristics. Based on the GTD, the dichotomous variable Western Europe/
North America indicates whether an attack occurred in Western Europe/North America 
(H1).8 Fatalities (log) describes the number of fatalities for each attack (H2). To account 
for skewness, the log of the original values was taken. Civilian/tourist target specifies 
whether attacks targeted individuals, the public in general, public places or tourists 
(RQ1).
Perpetrator characteristics. To measure perpetrator characteristics, the names of perpetra-
tors behind all attacks were retrieved from the GTD. Group association describes 
whether an attack is associated with individual(s) or group(s) (0 = Individual, 1 = Group, 
H3). In the GTD, attacks are listed as being perpetrated by individuals, for example, 
‘Jihadi-inspired extremists’ or formal organizations, for example, ‘Al-Qaida’, which was 
used to construct this variable. Domestic terrorism describes whether the perpetrator of 
an attack is a German group perpetrating an attack in Germany (0 = International Terror-
ism, 1 = Domestic Terrorism, H4). Importantly, this information could only be coded for 
groups: While we know that the ‘Freital Group’ is a German organization, the nationality 
of individuals, for example, ‘Jihadi-inspired extremists’, is unclear. Ideology describes 
the ideology of perpetrators independent of the specific attack (H5, H6). Perpetrators 
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were coded as following nationalist/ethnic, left-wing, right-wing, religious (non-Islam-
ist), religious (Islamist) and other/mixed goals, for example issue-specific terrorism. In 
some cases, the ideology of perpetrators was not known or perpetrators were not known. 
For databases used to create Domestic terrorism and Ideology, please see the Supple-
mentary Material (Element A2).
Controls. Based on the GTD, four controls were included: Extended describes whether 
an incident lasted several days, which makes coverage more likely. Yearly trend describes 
the year an attack took place to account for an increase in coverage over time. Series 
describes whether incidents were part of a series of attacks. Doubt describes whether 
there is doubt that an act constitutes terrorism, for example if it is suspected to be an act 
of crime.
Multivariate analysis
The binary dependent variable, whether news covered an attack as terrorism, was 
regressed on controls, incident and perpetrator characteristics using logistic regression 
with robust standard errors. The regression was run in blocks of controls and incident 
characteristics (Model 1) and perpetrator characteristics (Model 2a–d). As the inclusion 
of Group association and Domestic terrorism led to smaller samples, these models are 
presented separately (Model 2a; 2b). The effect of Ideology with Islamist extremism as 
the baseline (Model 2c) and the interaction between only one type of Ideology, Islamist 
extremism, and Western Europe/North America (Model 2d) are also estimated separately. 
For robustness tests, including outlet-specific differences and clustering by perpetrators, 
please see the Supplementary Material (Element A3–5).
Results
Descriptive results
Between 2012 and 2018, German news outlets covered a minority of attacks: 2028 inci-
dents or 2.34% of all attacks that occurred globally were reported on as terrorism. Table 1 
lists the ten most prominent attacks. Few incidents dominate coverage, above all the 
attacks in Paris in November 2015 which were mentioned in 545 articles or 10.07% of 
coverage. Most prominent attacks took place in Western countries and were perpetrated 
by Islamist extremists: the Charlie Hebdo attacks (4.32%), the siege of a kosher supermar-
ket in France (2.2%), the bombings in Brussels (4.1%), the Boston marathon (2.18%), the 
attack on a concert in Manchester (2.14%) or incidents with trucks in Berlin (3.83%), 
Nice (2.85%) and Barcelona (2.13%). Only one attack outside of Western countries was 
covered comparably often: Boko Haram’s abduction of schoolgirls in Nigeria (2.68%), 
which received attention via the #bringbackourgirls-campaign.
To further illustrate the exclusive focus on Western countries, Figure 1 visualizes how 
many attacks that occurred in a given country were covered. For example, 23.16% of all 
attacks in Germany were covered as terrorism but only 2.7% of those in Iraq, the country 
that suffered most from terrorism throughout the observation period.
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Table 2 illustrates how many attacks by different perpetrators occurred and how often 
they were covered. It underlines that journalists focused on Islamist extremism. However, 
the sheer frequency of attacks by Islamist extremists might partly explain this selectivity. 
For example, 1593 attacks by Islamist extremists were reported on compared to 36 
attacks by right-wing extremists. By doing so, however, news still reported on 5.81% of 
all attacks by Islamist extremists and 8.82% of those by right-wing extremists.
Still, it is notable how much more consistently journalists used the term terrorism 
when describing violence by Islamist extremists. For example, when lone actors associ-
ated with Islamist extremism attacked civilians in San Bernardino in 2015, all outlets 
Table 1. Prominent attacks.




Paris attacks (November 2015) France Religious (Islamist) 545 (10.07%)
Charlie Hebdo attack France Religious (Islamist) 234 (4.32%)
Brussels bombings Belgium Religious (Islamist) 222 (4.1%)
Berlin truck attack Germany Religious (Islamist) 207 (3.83%)
Nice truck attack France Religious (Islamist) 154 (2.85%)
Chibok kidnapping Nigeria Religious (Islamist) 145 (2.68%)
Supermarket siege France Religious (Islamist) 119 (2.2%)
Boston bombings USA Religious (Islamist) 118 (2.18%)
Manchester bombing UK Religious (Islamist) 116 (2.14%)
Barcelona truck attack Spain Religious (Islamist) 115 (2.13%)
Figure 1. Coverage by region.
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portrayed the incident as terrorism. However, when a right-wing extremist attacked a 
church in Charleston, outlets mostly covered the incident as an act of racism and often 
avoided the term terrorism.
Multivariate results
Table 3 displays the logistic regression models. Incident characteristics were included 
across models; for interpretation, Model 2c as the model with the highest amount of 
explained variance but exclusion of the interaction term is used. H1 proposed an associa-
tion between the location of an attack and its depiction as terrorism. The odds of an 
attack being portrayed as terrorism increase by a factor of 19.08 if it occurs in Western 
Europe or North America (B = 2.95, p < .001). Results indicate strong support for H1. 
According to H2, lethal attacks are more likely to be portrayed as terrorism. The positive 
association between the logged number of fatalities and news deciding to cover an inci-
dent as terrorism support H2 (B = 0.81, p < .001). Related to RQ1, the odds of an attack 
being covered as terrorism increase by a factor of 1.11 if civilians, tourists, or public 
places are targeted (B = 0.11, p < .05). This effect is comparably small and not robust (see 
Supplementary Material, Element A3–A5). Thus, the type of victim does not consist-
ently or substantially influence labelling.
Turning to H3 and perpetrator characteristics, Model 2a illustrates that attacks by 
groups are more likely to be covered as terrorism than those by individuals. However, the 
difference is small: The odds of an attack being covered as terrorism rise by a factor of 
1.31 if the attack is perpetrated by a group (B = 0.27, p < .01). In addition, the effect is 
only partly homogenous and consistent (see Supplementary Material, Element A3). 
Support for H3 is limited. According to H4, domestic terrorism as attacks by domestic 
groups on domestic ground is less likely to be portrayed as terrorism. Model 2b indicates 
a consistent effect opposite to what was expected: The odds of an attack being covered 
as terrorism rise by a factor of 6.18 for domestic terrorism (B = 1.82, p < .01). H4 is not 
supported. H5 proposed that attacks by Islamist extremists were more likely to be cov-
ered as terrorism. According to Model 2c, attacks by Islamist extremists are more likely 
to be portrayed as terrorism than attacks by nationalist/ethnic (B = –1.49, p < .001), 
Table 2. Coverage by ideology.
Ideology of 
Perpetrator
Attacks Covered  
(% of attacks)
Nationalist/ethnic 9655 120 (1.24%)
Left 5412 24 (0.44%)
Right 408 36 (8.82%)
Religious (non-Islamist) 147 1 (0.68%)
Religious (Islamist) 27,420 1593 (5.81%)
Other/mixed 579 43 (7.43%)
Unknown ideology 1212 12 (0.99%)













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2. Interaction between ideology and location.
left-wing (B = –2.04, p < .001), or right-wing extremists (B = –.55, p < .01)9 or attacks 
where the ideology of the perpetrator is unknown (B = –1.76, p < .001) or the perpetrator 
is unknown (B = –2.07, p < .001). However, there is no consistent difference compared to 
religious, non-Islamist extremists (B = –1.73, p = .09) or perpetrators following other/
issue-specific ideologies (B = 0.01, p = .97). H5 is partly supported.
Related to H6, Model 2d displays the effect of attacks being perpetrated by Islamist 
extremists conditional on the location of the incident. The interaction effect (B = 6.61, 
p < .001) is visualized in Figure 2: While attacks by Islamist extremists are more likely 
to be portrayed as terrorism, this effect is by far stronger for Western countries. H6 is 
supported.
Discussion
Journalists influence how societies perceive and respond to political violence. Based on 
the coverage of attacks in the German press, this study illustrates that news is selective, 
even biased in which attacks are reported on as terrorism. In particular, journalists almost 
exclusively present lethal attacks in Western countries by Islamist extremists as terror-
ism. At the same time, they hesitate to use the term for violence by left- or right-wing 
extremists.
How news media define terrorism: Western targets, Islamist perpetrators
News media are more likely to cover attacks in Western countries as terrorism (H1), 
especially those that are lethal (H2). However, whether attacks target citizens or tourists 
does not have a substantial effect (RQ1). This is mostly in line with previous research 
showing proximity and lethality to be associated with media attention to political 
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violence (Kearns et al., 2019; Sui et al., 2017) and the portrayal of incidents as terrorism 
(Betus et al., 2020; Ghazi-Tehrani and Kearns, 2020). As the use of violence is a consti-
tutive element of how many define terrorism (Schmid, 2011; Weinberg et al., 2004), it 
comes as little surprise that violent acts are more often called terrorism. However, that 
news focuses on in-group related targets, that is, Western countries, underlines that 
national contexts impact which incidents are considered terrorism. May it be that attacks 
further away are considered too irrelevant to be covered by journalists or that they are 
covered, but as war or insurgencies: Through highly selective coverage, journalists por-
tray terrorism as a threat mostly affecting Western citizens. In contrast, coverage is not 
reflective of violence elsewhere, for example the Middle East.
Journalists also consider information on perpetrators to interpret political violence. 
Attacks by groups were more likely to be portrayed as terrorism than those by lone actors 
(H3) similar to previous studies (Betus et al., 2020; Ghazi-Tehrani and Kearns, 2020). 
However, this effect is small, partly inconsistent and the concept of lone actor terrorism 
more complex than could be measured here (Kenyon et al., 2021), which is why readers 
should interpret these findings with a grain of salt. Domestic terrorism, here attacks by 
domestic groups on domestic soil, is also more likely to be depicted as terrorism than 
international terrorism (H4). This indicates that violence by in-group members is not 
downplayed in contrast to what was expected based on previous studies (Crenshaw, 
2014; Fishman and Marvin, 2003). Also, attacks by Islamist extremists are more likely 
to be called terrorism than attacks by perpetrators following other forms of extremism or 
attacks where motives were unclear. In particular, violence by left-wing extremists or 
nationalist/ethnic extremists is far less likely to be covered with references to terrorism 
than attacks by Islamist extremists. Differences in coverage of right-wing extremism and 
Islamist extremism indicate a similar effect that is, however, less pronounced. To some 
extent, a focus on ideology-driven violence is understandable: Most definitions of terror-
ism stress ideological motives (Weinberg et al., 2004). If news cannot construct meaning 
around violence, incidents might not be portrayed as terrorism but instead as crime or 
acts of war. However, findings support a troublesome development indicated by previous 
studies (Betus et al., 2020; Dixon and Williams, 2015; Matthes et al., 2020): News exag-
gerates the threat of Islamist extremism by mostly linking terrorism and Islam. Extending 
previous studies, results indicate that, at the same time, the threat of right-wing, left-wing 
or ethnic/nationalist extremism is largely ignored, as such violence is rarely depicted or 
not depicted as terrorism. This selectivity is only partly explained by the fact that vio-
lence by Islamist extremists was far more prevalent in the observation period than, for 
example, attacks by right- or left-wing extremists.
Overall, this study extends scholarship on coverage of political violence. It illustrates 
that SIT may not only explain out-group bias towards Islam in news coverage (Matthes 
et al., 2020) and related media effects (Von Sikorski et al., 2017; Schmuck et al., 2021), 
but also how journalists use the term terrorism. As an indicator of in- and out-group bias 
in the news, journalists portray violence as terrorism to condemn specific incidents and 
its perpetrators. This is often the case when journalists’ national identities become more 
salient, for example when in-group members are threatened by out-group members. 
Thus, journalists consider information about the incident and its perpetrators to make 
sense of violence. This study therefore extends previous research which either ignored 
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perpetrator characteristics or mainly analysed how violence by Islamist extremists is 
reported on. Results of this study indicate pronounced differences related to how journal-
ists cover various extremist ideologies, domestic terrorism and lone actor terrorism.
Implications: Why is selective coverage of political violence a problem?
Readers should keep in mind that ‘there is no absolute definition of terrorism for journal-
ists to reference, nor are they obligated to select and consistently apply a specific defini-
tion.’ (Betus et al., 2020: 1–2) Certainly, there is no ‘right’ way of covering political 
violence – its mere existence poses an ethical dilemma (Abubakar, 2020). Terrorists 
capitalize on the fact that journalists are expected to alert readers of current events and, 
thus, attacks will become news (Nacos, 2016). However, selective coverage of political 
violence may have unintended consequences as news is a ‘powerful tool for priming how 
individuals think and behave in response to a terror attack’ (Schmuck et al., 2021: 4). 
Apart from distorted risk perceptions of the likeliness of terrorism in Western countries 
(Mitnik et al., 2020), selective or stereotypical coverage can lead to fear and Islamophobia 
(Von Sikorski et al., 2017, 2021). In fact, many citizens simply assume that perpetrators 
of attacks are Islamist extremists (Schmuck et al., 2021). Thus, journalists’ selective use 
of the term terrorism may bias public perceptions of risks and lead to hostile attitudes 
towards Islam.
Focusing on some forms of extremism may also lead to a lack of policy responses to 
others. Mitnik et al. (2020) argue that, to some extent, counterterrorism responses are 
based on which forms of extremism receive attention. If news does not underline that 
right- or left-wing extremism also poses a threat, there is no pressure on governments to 
provide the resources necessary to combat them.
When using the term terrorism, journalists often adapt the language of politicians 
(Abubakar, 2020). Thus, journalists may allow for governments to pursue political agen-
das through the news, for example to legitimize war (Ahmad, 2020). Hence, journalists 
should carefully reflect when to portray acts as terrorism and when to prefer more neutral 
descriptions to serve as a source of information rather than as a tool of politicians.
Limitations and the road ahead
Results should be interpreted in light of several limitations. The GTD suffers from com-
mon pitfalls in terrorism studies such as the exclusion of state terrorism. Also, operation-
alizations of domestic and lone actor terrorism may not grasp the theoretical complexity 
of these concepts (Berkebile, 2017; Kenyon et al., 2021). Journalists may not have been 
aware of all information in the GTD at the time of reporting. While it is likely that once 
an attack occurred, it was immediately clear who was attacked where, information on the 
perpetrator may have only emerged over time. Additionally, the dependent variable 
measured which acts are reported on as terrorism in contrast to those covered as war or 
crime and those not covered at all. As such, it is also a measure of news attention. 
Findings might partly be explained by news value theory as newsworthy events are cov-
ered more, here with references to terrorism. However, if news associates terrorism more 
with, for example, Islamist extremists, it does not really matter whether attacks 
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are covered with a different label or not at all. The audience will still be more likely to 
connect Islam to terrorism. Lastly, given that coverage changed after 9/11 (Mitnik et al., 
2020), it may change again, for example due to the Christchurch shooting in 2019, which 
sparked discussions about the threat of white supremacist violence (Cai and Landon, 
2019). Future studies should analyse changes over time, for example whether Christchurch 
changed coverage.
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study illustrates that cultural, social and politi-
cal sentiments in a given country influence coverage of political violence. It underlines 
the decisive role of journalists’ national identities that foster in- and out-group bias in 
coverage, including how the term terrorism is used. It also shows that news portrays ter-
rorism in way that fuels fear of Islam while neglecting left- or right-wing extremism.
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Notes
1. The term ‘Islamist extremism’ is used to delineate actors who claim a religious, Islam-inspired 
motivation.
2. Betus et al. (2020) and Ghazi-Tehrani and Kearns (2020) offer long-needed contributions 
including a broader set of attacks – but, as is discussed later, focus on US coverage of attacks 
within the US.
3. In particular, they criticize that due to interlinkages between terrorism studies and law 
enforcement agencies, terrorism research has adopted state-centric priorities and neglected 
state terrorism (Jackson, 2007) – something that also pertains to this study, as discussed later.
4. Scholars disagree in terms of how much support lone actors may receive from groups or 
whether they are characterized by self-radicalization (Kenyon et al., 2021). Given these disa-
greements, a comparably simple distinction of lone actor versus group terrorism is used in this 
study.
5. For example, attacks by German citizens in Germany constitute domestic terrorism. Attacks 
by German perpetrators abroad or non-German perpetrators targeting Germany constitute 
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international terrorism. However, Berkebile (2017) emphasizes that the nationality of victims 
should also be domestic. Thus, attacks by German citizens in Germany against foreign tour-
ists may not be considered domestic terrorism by some scholars. Communication studies 
mostly focuses on domestic perpetrators (Mitnik et al., 2020) or domestic locations (Chermak 
and Gruenewald, 2006) to analyse domestic terrorism, similar to news media. Consequently, 
this study considers only two criteria mentioned by Berkebile (2017).
6. Which is, in fact, not the case as data on attacks by Islamist extremists illustrates (Start, 2019).
7. This was also indicated by the content analysis. Only very rarely, incidents describes in arti-
cles could not be matched to those in the GTD. Most described the disappearance of the 
EgyptAir Flight 804 in 2016. While news speculated about this being terrorism, this was later 
dismissed and the incident not included in the GTD.
8. In this study, Western Europe/North America includes Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Norway, the UK, the US, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
9. This effect is not consistent for Die Welt and when clustering by groups (see Supplemental 
Material, Table A3.4 and A5). Given the smaller effect size and the partly inconsistent effects, 
differences in how Islamist extremists are covered in comparison to right-wing extremists 
seem to be less pronounced.
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